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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j)
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue 1: Did the trial court err in dismissing sua sponte Plaintiffs5 private attorney
general claim?
The sua sponte dismissal of Plaintiffs' private attorney general claim is a question
of law reviewed for correctness. Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d 668, 669
(Utah 1989); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Natl Bank, 737 P.2d 225 (Utah 1987).
Issue 2: Did the trial court err in denying legal fees to Plaintiffs under the private
attorney general doctrine,1 where Plaintiffs' lawsuit succeeded in accomplishing the
vindication of strong and societally important public policies?
"Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law" reviewed
for correctness. Warner v. DMG Color, Inc. 20 P.3d 868 (Utah 2000)(citing,
Softsolutions v. Brigham Young Univ., 2000 UT 46, P12, 1 P.3d 1095) (Utah 2000). The
award of fees or denial thereof under the private attorney general doctrine also raises
important issues of public policy requiring limited discretion to the trial court. See, State
vJPena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994) (stating that "policy reasons" can require the
court to further limit the discretion afforded the lower court).

1

Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comnu 885 P.2d 759 (Utah 1994).
1

Issue 3: Did the trial court err in summarily dismissing plaintiffs' request for
declaratory relief holding that the court as a matter of law lacked authority to provide
declaratory relief pertaining to the acts of elected officials?
A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law, reviewed with no deference to the
trial court under a correctness standard. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp..
811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991).
Issue 4: Did the trial court err in holding that Plaintiffs lacked authority to
commence and maintain an action for removal of Defendants from office for committing
unlawful activities?
The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law, reviewed for
correctness, according no deference to the legal conclusion of the trial court. See,
Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913, 914-15 (Utah 1998); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936
(Utah 1994).
Issue 5: Did the trial court deny Plaintiffs due process of law by dismissing causes
of action without motion, without notice and without adequate opportunity to be heard?
The proper interpretation of rules of procedure is a question of law, reviewed for
correctness with no deference to the decision of the trial court. Ostler v. Buhler, 989 P.2d
1073, 1074 (Utah 1999). Due process is a question of law requiring a heightened
standard of review for correctness without deferring to the district court. See Ron Case
Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989); Madsen
v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988).

2

Issue 6: Did the trial court err in considering only criminal contempt when the
evidence of Defendants' actions clearly supports a findings of civil contempt finding so
as to allow compensation to Plaintiffs as the parties harmed by the contempt?
The effect of a given set of facts is a question of law, reviewed for correctness
with no deference to a trial court's determination. State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 281
(Utah 1994). State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) ("The effect of a given set of
facts is a question of law.1').
Issue 7: Did the trial court err in failing to enter adequate findings of fact and
conclusions of law?
It is a matter of law reviewed for correctness that a trial court is required to make
explicit findings of fact in support of its legal conclusions. See Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d
226, 230 (Utah 1997).
ORDERS BELOW
A copy of the trial court's Memorandum Decision (including the trial court's
amended order regarding Defendants' stipulated injunction) dated October 22, 2001, is
provided in Addendum A; a copy of the trial court's Final Order dated December 20,
2001, is provided in Addendum B; and a copy of the trial court's Memorandum Decision
regarding Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and Rule 56(f) motion dated January 18,
2002, is provided in Addendum C.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Constitution Article L Section 1
(The right of citizens to protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances).
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Utah Constitution Article L Section 2
(All political power is inherent in the people; and all free governments are founded on
their authority for their equal protection and benefit).
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 7
(No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law).
Utah Constitution Article VL Section 29
(Forbids any county, city, town, school district, or other political subdivision of the State
to lend its credit or subscribe to stock or bonds in aid of any railroad, telegraph or other
private individual or corporate enterprise oi undertaking.).
UCA 77-6-1 etseq.
(Removal of public officers by judicial proceedings).
UCA 78-33-1 et seq.
(Declaratory Judgment Act).
UCA 10-8-2
(Acquisition and disposal of property for municipal purpose).
UCA 10-8-8
(Ordinance required to vacate Park use of municipal property).
West Jordan Unified Development Code (WJUDC) 10-1-201(e)
(City Council shall notice and hold public hearing on recommendation forwarded by
Planning Commission for amendment to General Plan) Addendum D.
WJUDC 10-1-201(g)(3)
(Legal elements for amending the General Plan) Addendum E.
UCA 10-9-303
(City Council shall notice and hold public hearing on recommendation forwarded by
Planning Commission for amendment to General Plan).
UCA 10-3-608
(Motion and two-thirds vote required to expel any person who is disorderly during the
meeting of the governing body.).
West Jordan Resolution 01-30
(The party for whom the agenda has been brought forward shall be given the opportunity
to present any additional information that party deems appropriate) Addendum F.

4

CJA 4-501
(Civil Practice - Motions).
West Jordan Municipal Code 2-7-102, Purchases and Encumbrances, Services,
("Contracts for services where the amount to be paid by the City is $15,000 or more, shall
be awarded only after competitive proposals have been requested and received.")
Addendum G.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants, collectively comprising a majority of the West Jordan City Council,
including the then-current mayor, unlawfully changed the West Jordan General Plan to
facilitate the alienation and private commercial development of a part of the Main West
Jordan City Park property (commonly referred to as the "Sugar Factory Property").
Plaintiffs, officers and members of the West Jordan Parks & Recreation
Committee, brought suit seeking several actions: (Count 1) rescission of the unlawful
General Plan change, (Count 2) an injunction preventing Defendants from acting in
furtherance of the unlawful General Plan change, (Count 3) declaratory judgment
determining whether Defendants possessed the authority to dispose of public park
property for private commercial development and, if so, what procedural safeguards must
they follow to protect the public's interest in its parklands, (Count 4) an order enjoining
Defendants from actions inconsistent with the declaratory relief requested, (Count 5)
removal of Defendants from office, and (Count 6) an award of legal fees under the
private attorney general doctrine.
At the temporary restraining order (TRO) hearing, Defendants stipulated on the
record in open court that they would not act in furtherance of their unlawful General Plan
change without first giving Plaintiffs 45 days prior written notice. The court entered its
5

order in Plaintiffs' favor consistent with Defendants' stipulated injunction. Addendum
A.
Defendants moved to dismiss Count 3, 4, and 5 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. R. 348.
The trial court summarily granted Defendants' motion and also sua sponte dismissed
Count 6, Plaintiffs' claim for relief under the private attorney general doctrine. R. 487488.
Despite the court-ordered injunction, Defendants, within approximately one month
of the TRO hearing, awarded a contract for the design of the Sugar Factory park property
in furtherance of Defendants' unlawful General Plan change. See Addendum H.
Plaintiffs renewed their motion for injunctive-relief, which the court treated as an
order to show cause why Defendants should not be held in contempt of court for violating
their in-court stipulated injunction. R. 487-488. On the eve of Defendants' Contempt
Hearing, Defendants rescinded their unlawful General Plan Change, expressly stating in
official city documents that they were doing so in direct response to Plaintiffs' lawsuit in
order to render the same moot, thus, hoping to avoid potential contempt sanctions.
Addendum I.
The trial court found at the Contempt Hearing that Plaintiffs "performed an
important service" and that Plaintiffs "succeeded . . . to accomplish [their] purposes" of
their lawsuit. R. 801 at page 46. Moreover, at Defendants' Contempt Hearing, the trial
court expressed its belief to counsel for both parties, "off the record," that Defendants
actually violated their in-court-stipulated injunction. R. 761-763.

6

The trial court

reviewed Defendants' conduct only in light of a criminal contempt standard. Addendum
B. However, the record evidence, however, clearly supports a finding of civil contempt,
which would have allowed Plaintiffs to recover their legal fees for enforcing the court's
order.
Also at Defendants' Contempt Hearing, the trial court addressed Plaintiffs' motion
for reconsideration of the court's prior sua sponte dismissal of Plaintiffs' private attorney
general claim. The trial court again denied Plaintiffs' claim for fees, erroneously holding
that "it wasn't any decision of this Court that resulted in overturning the actions of the
[Defendants] but rather the [Defendants themselves] reconsidering their actions." R. 801
at page 46.
This matter comes before this Court on appeal because the trial court sua sponte
and incorrectly dismissed Plaintiffs' private attorney general claim, even though
Plaintiffs' were successful in correcting Defendants' unlawful actions.

Moreover,

without affording Plaintiffs any opportunity to conduct discovery, the trial court
summarily dismissed Plaintiffs' claims for declaratory relief, injunctive relief to
implement the requested declaratory judgment, and Plaintiffs' action for removal of
Defendants from office.
Further, at Defendants' Contempt Hearing, the trial court, without notice,
dismissed the remainder of Plaintiffs' case without affording Plaintiff any opportunity to
have conducted discovery, and without notice, motion or an adequate opportunity to be
heard on the matter.

7

Plaintiffs moved the court to reconsider its ruling and grant Plaintiffs a reasonable
opportunity to conduct discovery under URCP 56(f).3

The court denied Plaintiffs5

motions. This appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendants are four members of the West Jordan City Council, including the thencurrent mayor who is a sitting and voting member of the City Council. R. 4, 66, 73, 80
Defendants combined together with the intent to unlawfully alienate West Jordan Main
City Park property for a private commercial development. To accomplish their purposes,
Defendants began by arbitrarily and unlawful amending the City's General Plan.4 R. 4248, 50-56, 58-64, 381-382, 420-441, 66-71, 73-78, 80-85.
Plaintiffs are officers and members of the West Jordan Parks & Recreation
Committee (as well as residents and taxpayers of West Jordan) who have for many years
been engaged in the design and development of the Main City Park. R. 4, 66-67, 73-74,
3

Plaintiffs had served written interrogatories on Defendants to which Defendants moved
for a protective order on the basis that the parties had not yet met and conferred under
URCP 26(d and f). R. 495-496. However, the parties did meet and confer pursuant to
URCP 26(f) on November 13, 2001. R. 678.
4
The facts set forth herein are largely taken from the uncontested and unrefuted affidavits
of record of Plaintiffs and West Jordan City Council Members Gordon Haight, Brian Pitts
and Natalie Argyle. These Affidavits are reproduced for the convenience of the Court in
the Addenda as follows: Affidavit of City Council MemberGordon Haight dated May 9,
2001, Addendum J, R. 42-48; Affidavit of City Council MemberBrian Pitts dated May
9, 2001, Addendum K, R. 50-56; Affidavits of City Council Member Natalie Argyle
dated May 9, 2001, July 26, 2001 and August 13, 2001, Addendum L, R. 58-64,
Addendum M, R. 381-382, and Addendum N, R. 420-441, respectively; Affidavit of
Robert Shipman dated May 9, 2001, Addendum O, R. 66-71; Affidavit of Kathleen
Rollman dated May 9, 2001, Addendum P5 R. 73-78; Affidavit of Dale Sweat dated May
9, 2001, Addendum Q, R. 80-85; and Affidavits of Kenneth R. Ivory dated July 26, 2001

8

80-81. The Main Park Master Plan, including therein the Sugar Factory property in
question, was adopted by the City Council in 1995 and in furtherance of the Main Park
Master Plan, the City spent several million dollars enhancing this park property.
Addenda J, K, L, O, P, Q.
On April 18, 2001, Defendants proposed to the Planning Commission a change to
the General Plan for the private commercial development of Main City Park property
(often referred to as the "DAT Plan"). After full consideration, the Planning Commission
unanimously rejected Defendants' DAT Plan amendment. R. 43-44, 51-52, 59-60, 67-68,
74-75,81-82.
At the same Planning Commission public hearing, Plaintiffs proposed a competing
plan for the Main City Park, which the Planning Commission approved, on a unanimous
vote (the "Citizens-Parks & Recreation Committee Plan"). R. 43-44, 51-52, 59-60, 67-68,
74-75, 81-82, 325-326.

The Planning Commission forwarded their unanimous

recommendation of the Citizens-Parks & Recreation Committee Plan to the City Council
for further public hearing as required by local and state law.5 Id. Defendants, however,
did not schedule a public hearing on the Plaintiffs' recommended plan, but had scheduled
a hearing on their own DAT Plan, even though the Planning Commission had
unanimously rejected their DAT Plan. R. 44, 52, 60, 68, 75, 82.

and December 10, 2001, Addendum R, R. 742-743, and Addendum S, R. 761-763,
respectively.
5
WJUDC 10-l-201(e), Addendum D, and UCA 10-9-303, (City Council shall notice
and shall hold public hearing on the recommendation forwarded by planning
commission).
9

At the May 1, 2001, public hearing before the City Council on the rejected DAT
Plan, contrary to local ordinances for public hearings, Defendants refused to permit the
Citizens-Parks & Recreation Committee to make any presentation.6 R. 44, 52, 60, 68, 75,
82. Counsel, acting as a representative of the Citizens-Parks & Recreation Committee
Plan, inquired why Defendants were not following the local and state laws requiring a
public hearing on the Citizens-Parks & Recreation Committee Plan unamimously
recommended by the Planning Commission.7 R. 44-45, 52-53, 60-61, 68-69, 75-76, 8283. Defendants refused to respond to the points of legal procedure raised by counsel, as
the Citizens-Parks & Recreation Committee representative.

Id.

Rather, Defendants

unlawfully had him physically removed from the public hearing in order to prevent any
o

further challenge to their actions. Id.
Subsequently, a minority city council member asked city staff if Defendants'
proposed DAT Plan amendment to the General Plan complied with the legal elements of
West Jordan's Unified Development Code (WJUDC).9 Addenda J, K, L. R. 45-46, 5354, 61-62. Staff responded that it did not. Id. The same minority council member
6

West Jordan Resolution 01-30, Rule 6 - Business and Meeting Procedure, Public
Hearings, Addendum F, provides that "Pubic Hearings shall be held when required by
law" and, "the representative for whom the agenda item is brought forth shall be
provided the opportunity to speak to the City Council and present any additional
information which [he] deems appropriate") dated April 17, 2001. Ignoring this
ordinance, Defendants limited the Citizens-Parks & Recreation Committee
representatives to three minutes of comment during the public comment period.
7
See, fns. 4 and 5, supra.
8
The removal of counsel from the public hearing was itself unlawful. UCA 10-3-608
requires a motion and a 2/3 vote to remove from a public hearing one who is deemed
disorderly. Defendants made no motion nor submitted to vote the removal of the Parks &
Recreation Committee representative from the public hearing..

10

moved to postpone consideration of Defendants' DAT Plan amendment pending
satisfaction of the WJUDC requirements by the Defendants as the advocates of the DAT
Plan. Id. Defendants defeated this motion on a 4-3 vote. Id. Defendants also defeated a
specific motion to allow the Parks & Recreation Committee to present their plan
amendment unanimously approved and recommended to the City Council by the
Planning Commission. R. 221-214.
Thereafter, Defendants approved their DAT Plan amendment to the General Plan
on a 4-3 vote. R. 45-46, 53-54, 61-62. Defendants approved their DAT Plan amendment
knowing that the same did not satisfy the legal requirements of their own law for a
general plan amendment. Id.
A few days later, dissenting city council members brought Defendants5 unlawful
General Plan change to the attention of the City Attorney who was not present at the May
1st public hearing. Addendum N. R. 423. He took no action. Id.
Consequently, Plaintiffs filed this action seeking to enjoin Defendants from acting
in furtherance of their unlawful General Plan change, for rescission of Defendants'
unlawful General Plan change and for declaratory relief regarding whether Defendants
have the authority to dispose of public parklands for private commercial development
and, if so, what procedures must be followed to safeguard the public's genuine interest in
its park property. R. 1-20.
At the TRO hearing, Defendants stipulated on the record in open court to the
injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs; that they would not act in furtherance of their
9

WJUDC 10-1-201(g)(3), Addendum E.
11

unlawful General Plan change without first giving Plaintiffs 45 days prior written notice.
R. 299-300, 483-486, See also, R. 800 at pages 87-90, 99-101. The court entered its
order consistent with Defendants' stipulated injunction. Addendum A. Id.
However, within approximately one month, Defendants, without notice to
Plaintiffs, voted 4-3 to award a $20,000 design contract in furtherance of their unlawful
General Plan change for the commercial development of the Sugar Factory park property.
R. 420-422, 426-428, 725-727, 729-730, 732-733, 735-736, 742-743. Defendants took
this action in violation of their stipulated injunction, despite admonitions from dissenting
city council members that Defendants' actions would violate their stipulated injunction as
well as City procurement ordinances.10 Addenda M and N. R. 729-730, 732-733.
Notwithstanding, these warnings, Defendants further approved the contract and
Defendant Donna Evans signed the contract Addendum H for the DAT Plan commercial
development design of the Main City Park Property in question in furtherance of
Defendants' unlawful General Plan change.11 R. 730.
In light of Defendants' violation of the court-ordered injunction, Plaintiffs
renewed their request for injunctive relief, which the court treated as an order to show
cause why Defendants should not be held in contempt of court. Addendum A, R. 355382, 801 at page 43-44. At Defendants" Contempt Hearing, Defendants inconsistently
10

West Jordan Municipal Code 2-7-102, Purchases and Encumbrances, Services,
("Contracts for services where the amount to be paid by the City is $15,000 or more, shall
be awarded only after competitive proposals have been requested and received.").
11
See, Addendum H, Agreement for Professional Consulting Services-Main City Park
Master Plan, signed by Defendant Mayor Evans on August 9, 2001. Page 5,

12

argued that the City never entered into an agreement, because "staff decided not to go
forward with the agreement." R. 707-708. Therefore, because "staff did not follow
through with the action taken by Defendants, Defendants should not be held in contempt,
even though Defendants took all the steps it could to enter into the contract and violate
the court's order. R. 707-708.12 As, Addendum H clearly reflects, Defendants did enter
into an agreement for the commercial development design of the Sugar Factory Property
in furtherance of Defendants' unlawful General Plan change and Defendants did so
without giving notice to Plaintiffs' as required by the stipulated injunction entered upon
an order of the court. R. 742-743.
The record evidence clearly supports a find of civil contempt. Defendants knew
what was expected of them. R. 483-485, R. 752-753, R. 800 at pages 103 (line 25)-105.
Addenda M and N.

The court's order was based on Defendants' own in-court

stipulation. Addendum A. See also Argument, Point 6, infra.

subparagraph 3 at the top describes the scope of the contract as including the Sugar
Factory Property in question, which was the subject of Defendants' stipulated injunction.
19

Such knowing misrepresentations to the court raises the specter of fraud on the court;
conduct that "defiled the court itself and prevented the judicial system from performing
"in the usual manner its impartial task" of adjudicating cases. Fraud upon the court may
be raised by the court sua sponte and an appeals court may vacate a lower court decree on
this ground. 12 James W. Moore, Moorefs Federal Practice § 60.21 [4][a and f] (3d ed.
1997). Plaintiffs submit that this court can find civil contempt based on the record
evidence. If not, the matter of contempt should be remanded for a proper hearing after all
appropriate evidence has been adduced.

13

Defendants had the ability to comply by giving 45 days prior written notice to
plaintiffs of any binding action on the Sugar Factory property in question and to refrain
from taking such action altogether.
Defendants intentionally failed or refused to comply. R. 420-422, 426-428, 725727, 729-730, 732-733, 735-736, 742-743, Addendum H. See also Argument, Point 6,
infra.
On the eve of Defendants' Contempt hearing, Defendants formally rescinded their
unlawful General Plan Change, expressly stating in official city documents that they were
doing so in direct response to Plaintiffs' lawsuit in order to render the same moot.13
Addendum I. R. 770-772.
The trial court found that Plaintiffs "performed an important service" and that
Plaintiffs "succeeded . . . to accomplish [Iheir] purposes" of their lawsuit. R. 801 at page
46 (lines 2-3 and 20-22).
Defendants are seeking to turn over public parklands to private development,
thereby denying the public access to their property. ADDENDA J, K, L, O, P, Q.
Plaintiffs' lawsuit, therefore, involves a matter of great public importance and public
policy involving public parklands for which public officials and private citizens have
made many personal sacrifices over mamy decades in order to acquire, develop, and
preserve for the West Jordan Main City Park. R. 47-48, 55-56, 63-64, 71, 78, 85.

13

See, Request for Council Action to repeal May 1, 2001 Amendment to General Plan
and City Council Minutes, dated November 13, 2001, stating "repealing this action would
eliminate the need for further litigation about this issue by rendering it moot."
Collectively, Addendum I.
14

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendants violated the law in amending the West Jordan General Plan by failing
to comply with the City's own ordinances, as well as state statutes. Defendants were also
attempting to unlawfully alienate City Park property to private development. The City
Attorney, when notified of the unlawful actions of Defendants, took no action.
Consequently, Plaintiffs were compelled to bring action to protect the City's parklands.
Plaintiffs "succeeded . . . to accomplish [their] purposes"14 in bringing suit against
Defendants to prevent them from acting in furtherance of their unlawful General Plan
change and to have their unlawful action rescinded. In doing so, the court found that
"Plaintiffs have performed an important service"15 to the general public in West Jordan.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs accomplished the "'vindication of a strong or societally important
public policy'" the costs of which "transcend [Plaintiffs'] individual pecuniary interest to
an extent requiring subsidization"16 under the private attorney general doctrine.
It was, therefore, plain error for the trial court sua sponte to dismiss Plaintiffs'
private attorney general claim, and particularly to do so well before the ultimate
resolution of Plaintiffs' underlying claims. Further, the trial court plainly erred in its
cursory legal analysis of the private attorney general doctrine.
By order of the court affirming Defendants' stipulated injunction and by
Defendants' acquiescence in rescinding their unlawful General Plan change on the eve of

14

R. 801 at page 46.
Id
16
Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm., 885 P.2d 759, 789-90 (Utah l994)(quoting,
Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 1314, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (Cal. 1977).
15

15

their Contempt Hearing, in direct response to Plaintiffs' lawsuit, Plaintiffs succeeded in
accomplishing the purposes of their lawsuit in protecting the Main City Park property
from the unlawful actions of Defendants and in defending the integrity of the City's
general plan and public hearing process. Plaintiffs bore the burdens required to "fight
City Hall," without any individual pecuniary interest, but for the benefit of the general
West Jordan public.
The progeny of cases from Serrano (see footnote 16), which was the underlying
authority for this Court's adoption of the private attorney general doctrine, clearly
recognize that, in circumstances such as this, Plaintiffs are rightly considered the
"prevailing party" justifying application of the private attorney general doctrine. See
Argument, Point 2, infra.
Therefore, this Court should rule as a matter of law that Plaintiffs are entitled to
their attorney fees,

or in the alternative, remand to the trial court for a determination

under the appropriate private attorney general legal standard.
Without such a fee-shifting mechanism for citizens who defend the law from
abusive practices, city officials can with impunity trample the law because, as a practical
matter, it is infeasible for private citizens to use their own private funds to enforce public
interests and policies against a renegade public juggernaut funded with their own tax

17

Whereupon, this Court should instruct the trial court to hold a hearing on the
appropriate amount of Plaintiffs' attorney fees consistent with this Court's order.
16

dollars.

Without such a fee-shifting mechanism, worthy citizen grievances will be

effectively "silenced or stifled because of lack of legal resources."
Similarly, the court plainly erred in summarily dismissing Plaintiffs' claims for
declaratory relief based on the trial court's erroneous belief that a district court lacks the
authority to enjoin the acts of elected officials.

The court further erred in refusing

Plaintiffs' the opportunity to adduce evidence in support of this claim.
The court plainly erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' claim for removal of Defendants
from office holding that Plaintiffs' lacked the authority to commence and maintain such
an action. The statutes authorizing and governing judicial removal of public officials
expressly allow private citizens to initiate such actions. UCA 77-6-1 et seq.
The court plainly erred in considering only criminal contempt when the evidence
of Defendants' actions clearly supports a finding of civil contempt thereby allowing
Plaintiffs to be compensated as the aggrieved parties for whom the order was entered.
Further the court erred in failing to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law with
respect to this issue.
The court plainly erred, violating Plaintiffs' due process rights, in dismissing the
balance of Plaintiffs' claims at Defendants' Contempt Hearing without prior notice,
motion or adequate opportunity for Plaintiffs to be heard on the matters.

18

Folsom v. Butte County Association of Governments, 652 P.2d 437, 448 (Cal.
19&2)(auoting Serrano v. Priest 569P.2d 1303, 1314 (Cal. 1977)).
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ARGUMENT
Point 1: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING SUA SPONTE
PLAINTIFFS9 PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL CLAIM.
1.

The Trial Court Lacked Authority to Dismiss Sua Sponte Plaintiffs5 Private
Attorney General Claim,
The trial court on its own motion, summarily and without warning or an

opportunity to be heard, dismissed Plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the private
attorney general doctrine.
When a trial court acts sua sponte to dismiss a plaintiffs claims it abemdons its
role as an impartial arbiter and neglects the principles of due process that serve as the
very underpinnings of our legal system. Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah
1983)("Preservation of the integrity of the adversarial system . . . precludes the court
from infringing upon counsel's role of advocacy"). When a court rules sua sponte, the
parties have no advance notice of the court's intended decision. The court makes the
decision in private then merely announces it. Indeed, what realistic opportunity does a
party have to persuade a trial court to not grant a motion made by the court itself.
The failure to give adequate notice and opportunity to participate constitutes a
denial of due process under Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. Plumb v. Utah,
809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990)("Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be
heard in a meaningful way are at the very heart of procedural fairness."); see also, Nelson
v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983)("where notice is ambiguous or inadequate
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to inform a party of the nature of the proceedings against him or not given in advance of
the proceeding to permit preparation, a party is deprived of due process."). Further, the
trial court's sua sponte dismissal of Plaintiffs' private attorney general claim is void.19
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss only briefed and requested dismissal of Counts 3
(Declaratory Relief), 4 (Injunction pertaining to Declaratory Relief) and 5 (Removal from
Office) of Plaintiffs' Complaint. R. 348. Defendants did not brief the issue of dismissing
Plaintiffs' claim for relief under the private attorney general doctrine.

R. 339-348.

Consequently, Plaintiffs did not have an opportunity to oppose an issue not even raised
by Defendants. The trial court plainly erred in dismissing sua sponte Count 6, Plaintiffs'
claim for relief under the private attorney general doctrine.
As addressed in Point 2, infra, this Court can hold as a matter of law that Plaintiffs
succeeded in correcting the unlawful actions of Defendants thereby vindicating matters
important public interest and hold as a matter of law that Plaintiffs are entitled to their
attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine. In the alternative, this matter
should be remanded to the trial court to allow Plaintiffs to adduce and present evidence at
an evidentiary proceeding consistent with the appropriate private attorney general legal
standards addressed hereinbelow.

19

Combe v. Warrens Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1984)("a trial
court has not authority to render a decision on issues not presented for determination.
Any findings rendered outside the issues are a nullity."). A void judgment cannot
subsequently become a valid judgment. Workman v. Nagle Constr., 802 P.2d 749, 753
(Ct App. 1990)("A judgment is void as against persons to whom due process has not
been accorded in its rendition.").
19

2.

It Was Clear Error For The Trial Court To Have Summarily Dismissed
Plaintiffs' Private Attorney General Claim Before Resolution Of The
Underlying Claims.
Plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining injunctive relief against Defendants which was

entered by order the court. Addendum A. Plaintiffs further succeeded in accomplishing
the rescission of Defendants' unlawful amendment to the General Plan. Addendum I.
However, the trial court dismissed sua sponte Plaintiffs' private attorney general claim
while Defendants' compliance while the court's injunctive relief order was still pending
and long before Defendants had rescinded their unlawful general plan change in direct
response to Plaintiffs' legal action.
"The couifs decision of entitlement to fees will therefore require an inquiry
separate from the decision on the merits - an inquiry that cannot even commence until
one party has 'prevailed.'" Folsom v. Butte County Assoc, 652 P.2d 437, 450-451 (Cal.
1982) {citing, White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Empl. Sec, 455 U.S. 445, 451 (1982)).
It is, therefore, counterintuitive that a claim for relief under the doctrine of private
attorney general would be dismissed in advance of the resolution of the underlying
claims. Subsequent to the trial court's sua sponte dismissal of Plaintiffs' private attorney
general claim, Plaintiffs did, in fact, fully succeed in accomplishing the objectives of their
legal action in the rescission of Defendants' unlawful General Plan change.
Simply stated, Plaintiffs' were successful in the 'vindication of a strong or
societally important public policy' . . . and the necessary costs in doing so 'transcend the
individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization." Stewart v.
Utah Pub. Serv.Comm., 885 P.2d 759, 789-90 (Utah 1994).
20

It is axiomatic that the violation of local and state laws by elected officials is a
matter of strong and societally important public policy.

See Argument, Point 2,

subparagraph 2, infra. The disposition of Main City Park property is equally a matter of
strong and societally important public policy.
Under Utah law, addressed in detail in Point 3, supra, public park property "is held
in trust for strictly corporate purposes, and, as a general rule, cannot be sold or disposed
of so long as it is being used for the purposes for which it was acquired." McDonald v.
Price, 146 P. 550, 551 (Utah 1915)(Emphasis added). Protecting public park property
"for which public officials and citizens have made many personal sacrifices over many
decades in order to acquire, develop and preserve for the Main City Park" is undoubtedly
a matter of "great public importance and public policy." Addenda J, K, L. R. 47-48, 5556, 63-64.
The West Jordan City Attorney, although he was notified of Defendants' unlawful
actions by dissenting city council members, elected to take no action. Plaintiffs sought no
individual pecuniary interest or recovery in suing Defendants. Plaintiffs merely sought to
defend the integrity of the law and the public's general interest in West Jordan's Main
City Park property.
Consequently, the trial court plainly erred in dismissing sua sponte Plaintiffs'
private attorney general claim before Plaintiffs' had even had the opportunity to
accomplish the objectives of their underlying claims.
However, in light of the fact that the Plaintiffs were ultimately successful in
accomplishing the rescission of Defendants' unlawful General Plan changes (Addendum
21

I) and in preventing Defendants' from acting in furtherance of such unlawful actions
(Addendum A), this Court can hold as a matter of law that Plaintiffs are entitled to their
attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine.
Point 2: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING LEGAL FEES TO
PLAINTIFFS UNDER THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
DOCTRINE, WHERE PLAINTIFFS' LAWSUIT SUCCEEDED IN
ACCOMPLISHING THE VINDICATION OF STRONG AND
SOCIETALLY IMPORTANT PUBLIC POLICIES.
1.

Private Attorney General Doctrine Exists To Foster Important Public
Policy.
"The [private attorney general] doctrine rests upon the recognition that
privately initiated lawsuits are often essential to the effectuation of the
fundamental public policies embodied in constitutional or statutory
provisions, and that, without some mechanism authorizing the award of
attorney fees, private action to enforce such important public policies will
as a practical matter frequently be infeasible."
Under the constitution of this state, "All political power is inherent in the people;

and all free governments are founded on their authority for their equal protection and
benefit" Utah Constitution Article L Section 2.(Emphasis added).

Consequently, the

right of citizens to protest against wrongs of their government and petition for redress of
grievances was also deemed a vital constitutional cornerstone. Utah Constitution Article
I, Section 1.
The private attorney general doctrine exists to subsidize civic-minded plaintiffs,
with no individual pecuniary interest, who successfully protest wrongs and petition

20

Woodland Hill Residents Assoc, Inc. et al v. City Council of Los Angeles et ah, 593
P.2d 200, 208 (Cal. 1979¥quoting, Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303, 1314 (Cal. 1977))
22

against the use of political power contrary to the integrity of the law, public policy, and
the general public interest. Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm., at 789-90.
Without such a fee-shifting mechanism, city officials can trample the law because
the average citizen (though genuinely civic-minded) is often financially powerless to
"fight city hall" in order to preserve "the rule of law" or some other general public
interest.

Without such a fee-shifting mechanism, "worthy claimants [are] silenced or
91

stifled because of lack of legal resources." (Emphasis added).
The rationale behind the private attorney general law is well summarized as
follows:
"If our [laws] are not to become mere hollow pronouncements which the
average citizen cannot enforce, we must maintain the traditionally effective
remedy of fee shifting in these cases."22
In Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm., this Court authorized the award of "attorney
fees to a party as a 'private attorney general' when the Vindication of a strong or
societally important public policy' takes place and the necessary costs in doing so
'transcend the individual plaintiffs

pecuniary interest to an extent requiring

subsidization." This Court based its decision in Stewart on the California Supreme Court
opinion on the private attorney general doctrine, Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569
P.2d 1303, 1314, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (Cal. 1977).
The application of the private attorney general doctrine to citizen actions to
rescind municipal violations of land use statutes and the issue of what constitutes a
21

Folsom v. Butte County Association of Governments, 652 P.2d 437, 448 (Cal.
m2)(quotinz Serrano v. Priest 569P.2d 1303, 1314 (Cal. 1977)).
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"prevailing party" for purposes of the private attorney general doctrine appear to be
matters of first impression in Utah. The progeny of cases from Serrano squarely address
these specific issues, as set forth below.
2.

The Private Attorney General Doctrine Applies to a Municipal
Official's Violation of Municipal Land Use Statutes.

There is little doubt that an action to enforce the City's General Plan ordinances
involve a "societally important public policy" since the City Council has deemed the
ordinances at issue here important enough to codify them as ordinances. To argue
otherwise would be an admission that the City's General Plan ordinances are merely
arbitrary, "hollow pronouncements."
In Woodland Hill Residents Assoc, Inc. et al. v. City Council of Los Angeles et
aL, 593 P.2d 200, 208 (Cal. 1979), the California Supreme Court addressed the issue of
awarding to citizens the legal fees and costs they incurred in seeking the reversal of
violations of municipal land use statutes, specifically actions contrary to the city's
general plan, holding that fees should be awarded, reasoning as follows:
"As we explained in Serrano III, the fundamental objective of the private
attorney general doctrine of attorney fees is 'to encourage suits effectuating
a strong [public] policy by awarding substantial attorney's fees . . . to those
who successfully bring such suits and thereby bring about benefits to a
broad class of citizens.' [citations omitted]. The doctrine rests upon the
recognition that privately initiated lawsuits are often essential to the
effectuation of the fundamental public policies embodied in constitutional
or statutory provisions, and that, without some mechanism authorizing the
award of attorney fees, private action to enforce such important public
policies will as a practical matter frequently be infeasible"
(Emphasis
added).
Isbell Ent, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co., 559 F.2d 274, 278 (5 m Cir. 1977).
Quoting, Serrano v. Priest 569 P.2d 1303, 1314 (Cal. 1977).
24

The above provides ample authority for the axiomatic ruling that as a matter of
law the violation of municipal land use laws (not to mention state statutes) by city
officials is a matter of public importance meriting the application of the private attorney
doctrine. Id. at 222-223 ("the public always has a significant interest in seeing that legal
strictures are properly enforced and thus, in a real sense, the public always derives a
'benefit' when illegal private or public conduct is rectified.").
The trial court therefore erred as a matter of law stating that although "plaintiffs
have performed an important service . . . it does not rise to the level for recoupment of
private attorney general fees under our theory of private attorney general." R. 801 at
page 46. This Court, in order to provide clarity and predictability in this area of law,
should unequivocally state that the violation by city officials of the City's own general
plan ordinances, as well as state statutes, implicates a societally important public policy
so as to trigger relief under the private attorney general doctrine when citizens must bring
legal action to correct the violation. Likewise, the protection of public property, in this
case public parklands, is a matter of societally important public policy as a matter of
law.24
3.

The Trial Court Erred Holding That Plaintiffs Were Not A
"Prevailing Party" For Purposes Of The Private Attorney
General Doctrine When Their Legal Action Was A Substantial
Factor In Accomplishing The Important Public Objective
Sought Therein.

24

Under this same reasoning, this Court should order Plaintiffs' fees to be paid under the
private attorney general doctrine on remand of Plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief
regarding the authority of and procedure for disposing of public parklands.
25

The trial court's Final Order states that "although plaintiffs have achieved success
through the legislative process, they have not obtained any order granting relief in this
action and cannot be viewed as prevailing parties entitled to an award of attorneys' fees
under a private attorney general doctrine." Addendum B at para. 4. This ruling mistates
both the law of the private attorney general doctrine and the facts of the case.
Plaintiffs did, in fact, obtain an order granting relief in this action.

Plaintiffs

sought an injunction to prevent Defendants from acting in furtherance of their unlawful
General Plan change. Defendants, in open court, stipulated to the injunctive relief sought
by Plaintiffs.

Defendants' in-court stipulation was entered as an order of the court

granting the injunctive relief Plaintiffs sought as against Defendants. Addendum A.
The court even went so far as to issue an order to show cause why Defendants should not
be held in contempt of the court's injunctive relief order issued at the request and for the
benefit of Plaintiffs. Addendum A.
Plaintiffs also succeeded in the underlying objective of their action to have
Defendants' unlawful General Plan change rescinded. On the eve of their Contempt
Hearing, Defendants rescinded their unlawful General Plan change expressly stating that
they were doing so in direct response to Plaintiffs' lawsuit in an effort to render
Plaintiffs' lawsuit moot.

Addendum I.

Plaintiffs thereby accomplished the very

purposes of their lawsuit. The trial court erred in holding that a plaintiff would only
"prevail" upon obtaining an order of the court granting relief. Such a holding does not
reflect the practical realities of the legal system and seriously hinders the interests of
judicial economy in promoting out-of-court resolutions.
26

In addressing the issue of who is a "prevailing party" for purposes of the private
attorney general doctrine, the California Supreme Court in Folsom v. Butte County
Association of Governments, 652 P.2d 437 (Cal. 1982) upheld the award of fees to
citizens even though there was no judicial order or judgment that compelled the
governmental body to change the action complained of by the citizens.
In Folsom, the governmental body, without court order or judgment, but in
response to litigation brought by citizen plaintiffs, acquiesced to the action demanded by
the citizen plaintiffs. Following such voluntary resolution, the citizen plaintiffs moved
the court to award their legal fees and costs. The principal issue in the case was whether
the citizen plaintiffs were the "prevailing party" since defendants performed the action
sought by the plaintiffs absent any order or compulsion of the court.
The California Supreme Court held that a "successful party" is one whose lawsuit
"contributed substantially to remedying conditions at which is was directed." Id. at 438439. The Folsom court provided the following rationale for its holding:
Common sense dictates that the determination of success . . . must depend
on more than mere appearance. As we said in Woodland Hills, the trial
court must "realistically assess the litigation and determine, from a
practical perspective, whether or not the action served to vindicate an
important right. . . ."
The inquiry as to a party's success must be a pragmatic one that may range
outside the merits of the underlying dispute. "It's initial focus might well be
on establishing the precise factual/legal condition that the fee claimant has
sought to change or a f f e c t . . . . With this condition taken as a benchmark,
inquiry may then turn to whether as a quite practical matter the
outcome, in whatever form it is realized, is one to which the plaintiff
fee claimant's efforts contributed in a significant way, and which does
involve an actual conferral of benefit or relief from burden when measured
against the benchmark condition.11
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The critical fact is the impact of the action, not the manner of its
resolution. If the impact has been the "enforcement of an important right
affecting the public interest1' and a consequent conferral of a "significant
benefit on the general public or a large class of persons" [an] award is not
barred because the case was won on a preliminary issue or because it was
settled before trial. As Congress seems to have reasoned in enacting the
Fees Act: "A 'prevailing party1 should not be penalized for seeking an out of
court settlement, thus helping to lessen docket congestion. Similarly, after
a complaint is filed, a defendant might voluntarily cease the unlawful
practice. (A court should still award fees even though it might conclude, as
a matter of equity, that no formal relief. . . is needed.") (House Jud. Com.
Rep. No. 94-1558 (Sept. 15, 1976) at p. 7; see also Sen. Jud. Com. Rep. No.
94-1011 (June 29, 1976) at p. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at p. 5908.)(Citations omitted.)(Emphasis added).
Id. at 454-455.
This result makes sense. To hold otherwise would permit a city council to avoid
having to pay legal fees by acquiescing to legitimate citizen action on the very eve of an
adverse judicial determination. Indeed, retaliatory officials could even manipulate the
process to punish those who challenge them by running up legal fees, with the citizens'
own tax dollars, with the intent to correct the misconduct just before becoming
accountable for fees.
The trial court's holding would effectively emasculate the very essence of the
private attorney general doctrine. Citizens could make the great sacrifices required to
successfully "fight city hall" only to lose tremendously in terms of the cost of the "fight,"
simply because a final judgment was not needed from the court. The merit of the Folsom
rye

"prevailing party" rationale is sustained in similar cases around the nation.
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Robinson v. Kimbrough, 620 F.2d 468, 475 (5 m Cir. 1980)( The court held that the
citizen plaintiffs were the "prevailing party" and awarded their legal fees and costs
28

In this matter, Defendants acted unlawfully in amending the General Plan to
dispose of public park property for a private commercial development. Plaintiffs' efforts
to dissuade them in the public hearing fell on deaf ears. When the City Attorney was
notified of Defendants' unlawful conduct by dissenting City Councilmembers, he also
failed or refused to take action.
Only after the City Attorney took no remedial action, after being notified by
dissenting city council members of Defendants' unlawful actions, did Plaintiffs file suit
seeking injunctive relief and rescission of Defendants' unlawful amendment of the
General Plan. Once in court, Plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining an injunctive relief order
against Defendants. Addendum A.

When Defendants violated the injunctive order,

Plaintiffs incurred additional fees and costs to bring the violation to the attention of the
court.

Plaintiffs thereupon succeeded in obtaining an order to show cause why

Defendants should not be held in contempt of the injunctive relief order. Addendum A.

holding that "[e]ven though plaintiffs obtained no formal judicial relief, their lawsuit was
a significant catalyst in achieving their primary objective."); Westfall v. Board of
Commissioners of Clayton County, 477 F.Supp. 862, 868 (North. Dist. Ga.
1979)("Defendants do not contest that their enactment of the present ordinance was a
direct result of the filing of plaintiff s complaint; nor could they seriously do so in light of
the events which occurred subsequent to filing. While no order with respect to the
original complaint was ever entered, that fact is not controlling [citation omitted].
Instead, defendants' actions in response to this suit are determinative. Accordingly, the
court concludes that plaintiff is a prevailing party."); and Criterion Club of Albany v.
Board of Commissioners of Dougherty County, 594 F.2d 118, 120 (5th Cir. 1979)('The
mere fact that the case did not proceed to judgment is not controlling. The fact that the
case did not proceed very far in court before becoming moot . . . does not constitute
sufficient reason to deny any award [of legal fees].").
26
Frankly, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a city attorney to oppose a majority of the
City Council since a majority has the potential to deprive the city attorney of his or her
job thus evidencing the need for the private attorney general doctrine.
29

Only after being caught with their hands in the cookie jar and being faced with sanctions
by the court, did Defendants finally admit their misconduct and rescind their prior
unlawful General Plan amendment. Addendum I.
The trial court found that "Plaintiffs have performed an important service" and
that Plaintiffs "succeeded . . . to accomplish [the] purposes" of their lawsuit. However, in
addressing Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the trial court's prior void sua sponte
dismissal of Plaintiffs' private attorney general claim, the trial court denied Plaintiffs'
claim holding that "it wasn't any decision of this Court that resulted in overturning the
actions of the [Defendants] but rather the [Defendants themselves] reconsidering their
actions." However, the trial court clearly erred, as Plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining the
court's injunctive relief order entered upon Defendants' in-court stipulation and in
obtaining the order to show cause itself. Addendum A.
This erroneous legal conclusion of the trial court would emasculate: the very
purpose of the private attorney general doctrine and render our laws "mere hollow
pronouncements." It would also allow rogue officials to increase the cost and burden of
litigation. An additional public policy benefit of a common sense rule pertaining to
"prevailing parties" would be to encourage the rapid resolution of disputes so as to
minimize the potential cost to the government and its taxpayers, as well as minimize the
burden upon the courts of actions such as this.
Based on the record before this court, this court can hold as a matter of law that
Plaintiffs conferred a substantial benefit upon the citizens of West Jordan and vindicated
important public interests and public policies in seeking to preserve the integrity of the

!$0

public hearing process, in requiring compliance with West Jordan's land use ordinances,
and in defending public parklands from private commercial development.

Plaintiffs

pursued this legal action at great hardship to themselves and with no individual pecuniary
interest, but rather for the common good. Wherefore, Plaintiffs submit that this court can
as a matter of law award Plaintiffs their legal fees and costs of this action under the
private attorney general doctrine, the amount to be established by evidence adduced on
remand.27
Point 3: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY DISMISSING
PLAINTIFFS9 CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF HOLDING
THAT THE COURT AS A MATTER OF LAW LACKED AUTHORITY
TO PROVIDE DECLARATORY RELIEF PERTAINING TO THE ACTS
OF ELECTED OFFICIALS.
The trial court denied Plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief as to the authority of
and procedures for municipal officials to dispose of public park property for private
commercial development stating that "this court lacks authority to enjoin a city council
from taking whatever legislative action it deems to be appropriate as long as the city
council action comply with applicable law. . . For the same reason, this court will not act

This Court has recognized the propriety of awarding the legal fees required of plaintiffs
to recover legal fees and costs in fee-shifting cases. Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d
890 (Utah 1996)("the unavailability of 'fees for fees' could render fee-shifting provisions
impotent. . . . An award of 'fees for fees' is not merely a remote descendant of the
underlying action from which it derives. Rather, it is an integral aspect of the statutory
scheme on which the underlying claim is based."); See also, Commissioner, INS v. Jean,
496 U.S. 154, 162 (I990)(quoting Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 344 (2d Cir.
1979))(,,,Denying attorneys' fees for time spent in obtaining them would dilute the value
of a fees award by forcing attorneys into extensive, uncompensated litigation in order to
gain any fees."').
31

to declare that a duly elected city council lack authority to act in its legislative capacity."
Addendum A (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs sought the court's guidance regarding just what is the applicable law in
Utah with respect to the disposition of public park property for private commercial
development. Without ever addressing what the law in Utah is regarding this important
matter, the trial court simply stated in circular fashion that it lacked authority to
pronounce declarations upon the legislative actions of a city council unless such actions
are unlawful.
The Utah Declaratory Judgments Act provides in pertinent part as follows:
Any person . . . whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected
by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have
determined any question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration
of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. UCA 78-33-2 (Emphasis
added).
This chapter is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to
afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights,
status and other legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and
administered. UCA 78-33-12 (Emphasis added).
As addressed above, Defendants seek to dispose of Main City Park property for a
private commercial development thereby depriving the public of its lands. Plaintiffs are
seeking declaratory judgment as to whether Defendants may do so and if so, how must
they do so to safeguard the public's interest in their public parklands. Plaintiffs assert
that Defendants may not dispose of public parkland for private gain. Plaintiffs further
assert that public parklands are held in tiust for the public and cannot be disposed of
merely by the sole whim or will of a city council without providing citizens with specific
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notice and an opportunity to be heard on the matter.

Plaintiffs

seek a declaratory

judgment to that effect.
"Municipal corporations hold all property in which the public is interested, such as
streets, alleys, public squares, commons, parks and wharves, in trust for the use of the
public." McQuillen, The Law of Municipal Corporations, §28.38 (3 rd Ed.)(Emphasis
added).

The general rule is often thus broadly stated: "Property acquired for park

purposes cannot be disposed for other purposes, even if also public." Sands & Libonati,
Local Government Law, §21.07.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized this rule with respect to park property in
McDonald v. Price, 146 P. 550, 551 (Utah 1915), stating:
"Cities of this state do not possess the power to sell and dispose of their
property which is devoted to, and used for, corporate purposes. As to
property such as streets, alleys, parks, public buildings, and the like,
although title is in the city, yet such property, it may be said, is held in trust
for strictly corporate purposes, and, as a general rule, cannot be sold or
disposed of so long as it is being used for the purposes for which it was
acquired." (Emphasis added).
The sanctity of park and recreational property is further codified in UCA 11-2-1
which provides in pertinent part that property acquired by any city for playgrounds or
recreational facilities "shall be deemed to be for public, governmental and municipal
purposes." As stated in McDonald, property owned by a city for public and municipal
purposes is "held in trust strictly for the benefit of the people.
Public assets are not intended to create private gain or advantage. Utah
Constitution, Article VI, Section 29 prohibits "any county, city, town, school district, or
other political subdivision of the State to lend its credit or subscribe to stock or bonds in
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aid of any railroad, telegraph or other private individual or corporate enterprise or
undertaking." This policy is aimed at preventing government from in any way using
public assets for private purposes.
Further, Utah Code Ann. 10-8-8 provides that the public use of parks may be
vacated only by ordinance (They may lay out, establish, open, alter, widen, narrow,
extend, grade, pave or otherwise improve streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards, sidewalks,
parks, airports, parking lots or other facilities for the parking of vehicles off streets,
public grounds, and pedestrian malls and may vacate the same or parts thereof, by
ordinance.")(Emphasis added).
As set forth in the Affidavits of Councilmembers Argyle, Pitts and Haight, and
Parks & Recreation Committee officers amd members Shipman, Sweat and Rollman, over
the past several years, "[i]n direct furtherance of the Main Park Master Plan, the City has
spent several million dollars modifying and enhancing the Main City Park." Addenda J,
K, L, O, P, Q. R. 43, 51, 59, 67, 74, 81. As addressed above, the Main Park Master Plan
included all of the Sugar Factory Property in question.
Defendants; never held a public hearing regarding vacating the park use of the
public park property "held in trust strictly" for the citizens of West Jordan as required
under UCA 10-8-8. The public interest in the public park property "held in trust strictly
for their benefit requires more than the unlawful actions of a bare majority of the city
council to dispose of such public trust property for a private commercial development.
The trial court clearly erred in summarily dismissing Plaintiffs5 claim for
declaratory relief, without ever addressing the legal standards for the important public
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policy matter of the disposition of public parklands. It is precisely the role of the courts to
provide protection to citizens in declaring the rights of citizens where a majority of a city
council demonstrates a clear propensity to act contrary to law simply because they
control a majority of city council votes.
Wherefore, Plaintiffs request for declaratory relief should be remanded for
proceedings in accordance with the Declaratory Judgment Act regarding whether
Defendants have the authority to dispose of public park property for private commercial
development and, if so, how must they go about it to protect the genuine public interest in
their parklands.
Point 4: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PLAINTIFFS LACKED AUTHORITY TO COMMENCE AND
MAINTAIN AN ACTION FOR REMOVAL OF DEFENDANTS FROM
OFFICE FOR COMMITTING UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES.
The trial court summarily dismissed Plaintiffs' claim for the removal of
Defendants from office holding that Plaintiffs' simply lacked the authority to commence
such an action. The court stated "there is simply no private right of action authorized
under [77-6-1]." Addendum A. The statutes governing the removal of a city officer
from office (UCA 77-6-1 et seq) clearly provide otherwise.
UCA 77-6-2, concerning the commencement of an action for removal, expressly
provides that "[a]n action for the removal of a[n] .. . officer of a city . . . may be initiated
by any taxpayer'' (Emphasis added). UCA 77-6-4 provides that the action is initiated
28

As this declaratory relief issue is a matter of societal importance beyond Plaintiffs'
individual pecuniary interest. Plaintiffs request that this Court authorize the award of fees
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when "a taxpayer . . . shall present the accusation." UCA 77-6-7 provides that "the
rights of the parties and procedures used shall be the same as in any civil proceeding."
(Emphasis added).
Removal of a public officer from office is a civil action. Skeen v. Craig, 31 Utah
20, 86 P. 487 (Utah 1906)("The question as to whether proceedings of this kind to
remove from office a public official are civil or criminal has been before the courts of
other states, and, while the decisions are not harmonious, yet the great weight of
authority, and as we think the better reasoned cases hold that such actions are civil.").
"The rules of civil procedure apply to removal trials." Madsen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 1086
(Utah 1985).
Plaintiffs commenced a civil action for the removal of Defendants from office.
Plaintiffs plainly alleged misfeasance and malfeasance in office by Defendants. Plaintiffs
were denied any opportunity to conduct discovery before the trial court summarily
dismissed Plaintiffs5 claim for removal of Defendants from office, summarily holding
that Plaintiffs lacked the authority to bring the action without any further explanation of
its ruling.
As a practical matter, the political realities and exigencies facing elected officials
such as county attorneys or even state attorneys general temper their ability and/or desire
to pursue removal actions of other elected officials.

If citizens are prevented from

initiating and maintaining civil actions for the removal of their public officials, and

under the private attorney general doctrine should Plaintiffs prevail in the declaration
sought for the purpose of protecting public parklands.
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county attorneys or attorneys general are too busy, disinterested, or otherwise actually or
practically conflicted, misfeasance and malfeasance of public officials will go entirely
unchecked until the next election cycle, by which time the damage that would be done to
public assets and the public good would be irreparable.
As UCA 77-6-1 et seq. expressly provides a private right of action. Plaintiffs
request that their removal action be remanded for proceeding consistent therewith and
that this court unequivocally state that Plaintiffs have both the right to initiate and to
maintain such action, and if successful, to recover fees under the private attorney general
doctrine.
Point 5: THE TRIAL COURT DENIED PLAINTIFFS' DUE PROCESS
OF LAW BY DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS9 CASE WITHOUT MOTION.
WITHOUT NOTICE AND WITHOUT ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO
BE HEARD.
In addition to the trial court's sua sponte dismissal of Plaintiffs' private attorney
general claim, addressed above, at Defendants' Contempt Hearing, the trial court
dismissed the balance of Plaintiffs' case without notice, motion, or adequate opportunity
to be heard, and without ever affording Plaintiffs any opportunity to conduct discovery.
Specifically, the trial court dismissed Counts 1 (Rescission of Unlawful General Plan
Change) and 2 (Permanent Injunction of Action in Furtherance thereof) of Plaintiffs'
Complaint and denied Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the court's prior dismissal
of Counts 3-6, as addressed above. Had Plaintiffs been afforded the opportunity to
conduct discovery, and to prepare and present evidence, Plaintiffs would show that
Defendants were still pursuing actions in furtherance of the unlawful General Plan
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change, Defendants were still seeking to dispose of public park property for private
commercial purposes and Defendants were still acting in violation of the City's Main
Park Master Plan adopted in 1995. However, without ever being given notice and the
opportunity to be heard on these matters, the trial court summarily dismissed the entirety
of Plaintiffs' action.
"In our judicial system, except in extraordinary circumstances that are not present
here, all parties are entitled to notice thai a particular issue is being considered by a court
and to an opportunity to present evidence and argument on that issue before decision. The
failure to give adequate notice and opportunity to participate can constitute a denial of
due process under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution." . Plumb v. Utah, 809
P.2d 734, 743 ((Utah 1990).
"[A] trial court has no authority to render a decision on issues not presented for
determination. Any findings rendered outside the issues [presented] are a nullity." Combe
v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1984); see also Utah R.
Civ. P. 7(b)(1) ("application to the court for an order shall be by motion").
"The right to prior notice and an opportunity to be heard is a critical part of our
judicial system. . . . A method of resolving cases that bypasses this requirement can not
be accepted as a fair, neutral, and rational process." Rubins v. Plummer, 813 P.2d 778,
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A judgment is void "if the court that rendered i t . . . acted in a manner inconsistent with
due process." Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah App.
1991) (quoting Automatic Feeder Co. v. Tobey, 221 Kan. 17, 558 P.2d 101,104 (Kan.
1976)); accord In Re Estate of Jones, 858 P.2d 983, 985 (Utah 1993); Brimhall v.
Mecham, 27 Utah 2d 222, 224, 494 P.2d 525, 526 (1972); Workman v. Nagle Constr.,
Inc., 802 P.2d 749,753 (Utah App. 1990).
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780 (Colo. App 1990)(citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011(1970)); see
also Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983) ("Timely and adequate notice
and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are at the very heart of procedural
fairness.").
"Preservation of the integrity of the adversarial system of conducting trials
precludes the court from infringing upon counsel's role of advocacy. . . . The interests of
justice are not enhanced when the court exceeds its role as arbiter by reaching out and
deciding an issue that would otherwise be dead . . . .,f Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245,
247 (Utah 1983).
In stead of addressing the merits of Plaintiffs' claims, the trial court simply
washed its hands of the matter instructing Plaintiffs to "have wiser heads than mine take a
look at it." R. 801 at page 46. Plaintiffs moved the court under Rule 56(f) to permit
discovery but the trial court denied Plaintiffs' motion.

Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient

unlawful conduct on the part of Defendants to survive a summary motion to dismiss and
have their day in court to fully review the conduct, acts and designs of Defendants with
respect to the Main City Park property.
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A trial court should liberally grant rule 56(f) motions unless they are "dilatory or
lacking merit." Price Dev. Co. v. Orem City, 995 P.2d 1237 (Utah 2000). It is plain error
for the trial court to dismiss Plaintiffs' case without affording Plaintiffs any opportunity
to conduct discovery because "[i]t was the information sought in the proceedings for
discovery, which [Plaintiffs] claimed would infuse the issues with facts sufficient to
defeat a motion for summary judgment.... Whether such would be the case can not [sic]
now be determined, because such facts, if they exist, were not allowed to be discovered."
Auerbach's, Inc. v. Kimball 572 P.2d 376, 377 (Utah 1977).
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The actions of the trial court in summarily dismissing Plaintiffs' case without
notice, motion, opportunity to conduct discovery or to prepare arguments in defense
offends not only the notions of due process but, in this case, the fundamental
constitutional pillars permitting citizens to protest against governmental wrongs and
petition for redress of grievances. As addressed above, the dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims
for removal of Defendants from office, for declaratory relief, and for review of the
actions of Defendants in violation of the City's Main Park Master Plan for farther the
private commercial development of public parklands should be remanded for proceedings
consistent with this Court guidance on the legal standards in these matters. Having
prevailed on the injunctive relief requested and the rescission of Defendants' unlawful
General Plan change, this Court can as a matter of law rule that Plaintiffs are entitled to
their fees for all action related thereto.
Point 6: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING ONLY
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT WHEN THE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANTS'
ACTIONS CLEARLY SUPPORTS A FINDING OF CIVIL CONTEMPT
SO AS TO ALLOW COMPENSATION TO PLAINTIFFS AS THE
PARTIES HARMED BY THE CONTEMPT.
In response to Defendants' conduct in direct violation of their stipulated
injunction, Plaintiffs filed a renewed motion for temporary restraining order. The trial
court treated Plaintiffs' renewed motion for injunctive relief as a request for an order to
show cause why Defendants should not be held in contempt of court, and ordered
Defendants to show cause.
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The trial court stated that the order to show cause why Defendants should not be held
in contempt of court "clearly flowed from plaintiffs arguments and repeated motions to
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The court, however, did not allow discovery or hold an evidentiary hearing. After
arguments, the trial court simply held that "I do not hold and do not find defendants in
contempt." The trial court offered no findings of fact and no legal analysis for its ruling.
Rather, the trial court merely stated that contempt "is potentially a criminal matter . . .
[a]s a result, the standard for ascertaining whether or not contempt has occurred I believe
to be beyond reasonable doubt." R. 801 at page 43. With respect to findings of fact the
court merely stated "in light of the standard for a contempt holding I am satisfied that the
actions of the City cannot be found to have been violative of the order of the court
beyond a reasonable doubt." R. 801 at page 44.
Despite the court's conclusory ruling, the court did state on the record "I have had
reservations about the actions by the city and I continued to have reservations about the
straight forward or lack of straight forwardness of the city council in its actions. Their
actions are, appear to be technically within the bounds of the law but just barely and in
my view the majority of the council has taken actions that came pretty close to skirting
what I understood to be the agreements that the City had put forward." R.801 at page 44.
The court did not permit any evidentiary hearing on the contempt matter despite
minority city council members Argyle and Haight being in attendance at the Contempt
Hearing and prepared to testify on Plaintiffs' behalf.
Having thus ruled, the court then requested counsel to approached the bench and,
off the record, admonished Defendants that she believed that Defendants intended to

have the Court consider actions subsequent to the May hearing that this Court held." R.
801 at pages 43-44.
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violate or intentionally violated the TRO Order but that it was out of deference to a
legislative body she did not hold Defendants in contempt. Addendum S. R. 761-762.
The trial court plainly erred in applying a criminal standard to a matter of civil
contempt.
The legal elements of contempt in the state of Utah as set forth in Von Hake v.
Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1170-71 (Utah 1988), are as follows:
As a general rule, in order to prove contempt for failure to comply with a
court order it must be shown that the person cited for contempt knew what
was required, had the ability to comply, and intentionally failed or refused
to do so. [citations omitted]. These elements must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt in a criminal contempt proceeding, [citation omitted] and
by clear and convincing evidence in a civil contempt proceeding.
"It is the purpose, not the method of the punishment, that serves to distinguish the
two types of proceedings." Id. "A contempt order is civil if it has a remedial purpose,
either to coerce an individual to comply with a court order given for the benefit of
another party or to compensate an aggrieved party for injuries resulting from the failure
to comply with an order." Id
The trial court converted Plaintiffs'' renewed motion for injunctive relief into an
order to show cause why Defendants should not be held in contempt. Plaintiffs also
requested the fees and costs they expended to compel Defendants' compliance with their
stipulated injunction.
Consequently, as the purpose of the contempt proceeding was entirely remedial in
nature, a civil contempt standard should have been applied. The following analysis of the
elements of civil contempt under a clear and convincing standard demonstrates that
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Defendants should have been held in contempt of court for violating their own stipulated
injunction and Plaintiffs should rightfully have been awarded their fees and cost to
compel Defendants' compliance with their own stipulated injunction.
1.

Defendants' Knew What Was Required

The court, for purposes of its order regarding plaintiffs' motion for temporary
restraining order, accepted Defendants' in-court stipulation that they would not award
any contract on the Sugar Factory Property and would give Plaintiffs 45 days prior
written notice of any such action. Addendum A.
The court expressly admonished Defendants to comply with their proffered
stipulation and warned them that the court would rehear the matter if they did not. The
court at the May 9, 2001 hearing provided: "I think what I am hearing them say is that
any action that they propose to take would be communicated to you with 45 days for
comment or opposition and if in your view that alters your position then you can come
back here." R. 800 at page 101. The Defendants stipulated that they would not "sell or
lease, we won V enter into binding contracts and we won 't move forward on any zone
change amendments99 affecting the Sugar Factory Property without first providing
Plaintiffs with 45 days prior notice of the proposed change.
(Emphasis added).

R. 800 at page 104.

Counsel for Defendants repeatedly represented that Defendants

would "not award any contract for action." R. 800 at page 88, lines 4-10.
Whereupon, the court, in making its ruling, further admonished Defendants
regarding their compliance with their stipulated injunction, as follows: "So for purposes
of this hearing, the TRO motion is denied.
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Subject to this stipulation with the

understanding that the matter may be reopened and I think the City fully understands
where I am coming from. Don't you?" R. 800 at page 106. (Emphasis added).
This stipulation is reflected in the court's order containing the following language:
"Defendants will not take any action in their official capacities . . . to: (c)
will not award any contract for actions pursuant to RFP regarding Sugar
Factory Property without first giving, during the course of this litigation,
the Plaintiffs forty-five days prior written notice to allow Plaintiffs to seek a
preliminary injunction with respect to such action." Addendum A.
Consequently, Defendants knew they were required to give Plaintiffs 45 days
prior notice in writing of any action that "might arguably" amount to awarding a contract
regarding the Sugar Factory Property. It was their own stipulated language to the court.
Further, the Affidavit of Councilmember Natalie Argyle (Addenda M and N) and
statements of Councilmember Gordon Haight reflected in the City Council Meeting
Minutes from July 17, 2001 (R. 732-733) reflect that both of these minority
councilmembers put the Defendants squarely on notice that Defendants' proposed action
on June 19, 2001, July 17, 2001 and August 7, 2001, for the "Approval of a Resolution
Awarding a Contract" regarding the Sugar Factory Property would violate the TRO
Order, not to mention the City's procurement ordinance because the amount exceeded the
maximum amount of $15,000 for contracts awarded without competitive bids..
Defendants clearly knew what was required of them under the TRO order. The
trial court's final order regarding contempt is silent as to the facts or legal conclusions for
this first element of contempt. Addendum B.
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2.
Defendants Had The Ability To Comply With Their Stipulated
Injunction.
Complying with the their stipulated injunction merely required that Defendants
give Plaintiffs 45 days prior written notice of any action that might arguably purport to
award a contract regarding the Sugar Factory Property. Certainly, Defendants had the
ability to provide written notice to Plaintiffs.
Giving Plaintiffs written notice, particularly in the face of specific admonitions
from minority councilmembers to comply with the their own stipulated injunction, was
certainly within Defendants' ability. Defendants were well aware of the address and
telephone number of counsel for Plaintiffs. Further, Defendants had the ability to refrain
from taking actions regarding the Sugar Factory Property that might arguably be in
furtherance of Defendants' unlawful General Plan change during the course of this
litigation.
Defendants clearly had the ability to comply with their own stipulated injunction.
In fact, the minority city council members were repeatedly urging them to no avail
comply with the court-ordered injunction. The trial court's order regarding contempt is
silent as to the facts or legal conclusions for this second element of contempt.
Addendum B.
3.

Defendants Intentionally Failed Or Refused To Comply With The
TRO Order

Defendants' intentionally took action in violation of the court-ordered injunction
by awarding a contract regarding the design of Sugar Factory Property for Defendants'
DAT Plan (the subject of Defendants' unlawful General Plan change), on June 19, 2001,
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and again on August 7, 2001. Addenda M and N. R. 732-733. Defendants gave no
notice to Plaintiffs of their intention to take action on the Sugar Factory Property in
furtherance of their unlawful General Plan change. Addendum R, R. 742-743.
The affidavits of Natalie Argyle (Addenda M and N), state that she put the
Defendants on notice "before the vote" that Defendants' action may likely be a violation
of Defendants' stipulated injunction. She further put the Defendants on notice "before
the vote" that their actions would run afoul of the City's purchasing ordinance requiring
competitive bids for any contract over $15,000. Id. Council Member Gordon Haight is
also on official record as having put Defendants on notice that their actions would violate
both Defendants' stipulated injunction and the City's purchasing ordinance. R. 732-733.
Despite unequivocal notice from these minority councilmembers, on June 19,
2001, Defendants voted 4-3 to award an agreement up to $20,000 regarding the Sugar
Factory area without ever giving Plaintiffs any notice of the matter.

Moreover, on

August 7, 2001, Defendant Donna Evans, with the approval of Defendants, approved and
signed a contract with French & Associates agreeing to pay $40,000.00 for the design of
Defendants' DAT Plan proposal for the Main City Park, including the Sugar Factory
Property that is the subject of their unlawful General Plan change. Addendum H, see
page 5, subparagraph 3.
Consequently, Defendants' actions clearly exhibited an intentional disregard for
specific admonitions from minority councilmembers that the Defendants' actions would
violate their stipulated injunction. Defendants' "state of mind" regarding their intentional
actions is further evidenced by the fact that they also willfully ignored their own
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purchasing ordinance requiring competitive proposals for such action. Consequently, it is
clear that Defendants acted intentionally in violation of the court-ordered injunction.
Defendants did not appear themselves to present any evidence why they should
not be held in contempt of court. In stead, Defendants' sole defense was limited to an
Affidavit of the City Manager, Gary Luebbers. Mr. Luebbers states that, despite
Defendants' acting to approve and award a contract regarding the Sugar Factory
Property, "staff determined that the agreement [regarding the Sugar Factory Property]
would not be necessary." (R. 688-690). Mr. Luebbers' statement flies in the face of
municipal law and public policy that city staff could simply ignore the resolutions and
actions of the City Council. .
In any event, such an argument fails to refute the fact that Defendants had taken all
the steps necessary to violate the court's order and, in fact, did so.

Counsel for

Defendants falsely represented to the court that Defendants never entered into a contract
regarding Defendants' commercial development plans for the Sugar Factory park
property. (R. 707-708). Plaintiffs, however, were able to obtain tod present at the
Contempt Hearing Addendum H, the contract signed by Defendant Donna Evans for the
commercial design of park property expressly including the Sugar Factory Property
subject to the injunction.
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This "evidence," the only evidence provided by Defendants, entirely fails to address the
elements of contempt as pertaining to Defendants' actions and their ability or intention to
comply, leaving the facts of Defendants' violation of the court-ordered injunction
uncontested.
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The trial court's order is silent on this third element of contempt with respect to
factual findings and legal conclusions. Addendum B.
As addressed above, Defendants knew what was required of them from their own
stipulated injunction, Defendants had the ability to comply, and Defendants intentionally
failed and refused to comply with their own stipulated injunction. Had the trial court
applied the appropriate civil contempt standard of clear and convincing evidence, no
doubt a contempt finding would have issued and Plaintiffs would have been compensated
for the damages, including fees and costs incurred in bringing Defendants9 contemptible
conduct to light.
Despite the trial court failing to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law with
respect the elements of civil contempt, this court can hold as a matter of that Defendants
did clearly violate their own stipulated injunction and further order the trial court to
award Plaintiffs the fees and costs they incurred in seeking to compel Defendants'
compliance with their own stipulated injunction.
Point 7: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER
ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
The "Final Order" entirely lacks any factual findings that indicate the issues
decided, the legal interpretations and applications made, and the subsidiary factual
findings in support of such decisions. Addendum B.
A trial court "must make the findings of fact explicit in support of its legal
conclusions." Willev v. Willev, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997). "Without findings of
fact, there can be no meaningful appellate review." Id. "It is axiomatic that the denial of
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[plaintiffs'] claims without the possibility of meaningful review . . .

is clearly

prejudicial." Adams v. Bd. Of Review of the Indus. Comm,, 821 P.2d 1 (UT.Ct.App.
1991).
Once the court attempts to "state its findings, identify the applicable law, and
articulate its logic, it may discover that critical facts are not properly before it, that the
law is other than anticipated, or that its initial logic is flawed. In such situations, a result
contrary to the initial conclusions . .. may be dictated." Adams at 6-7.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, Plaintiffs request that the Court remand Plaintiffs' counts 1-5 to the
trial court and order the trial court to enter express findings of fact and conclusion of law
consistent with this standards set forth by this Court after a full opportunity for Plaintiffs
to prepare and present their case. To the extent that this Court, does not hold as a matter
of law that Defendants clearly violated the court ordered injunction and that Plaintiffs are
entitled to fees under the private attorney general doctrine, Plaintiffs request on remand
that the trial court be ordered to enter express findings of fact and conclusions of law on
claims after a full opportunity to prepare and present their case.
There are sufficient undisputed facts in the record for this court to rule in favor of
Plaintiffs' private attorney general claim as a matter of law. Likewise, the undisputed
record facts clearly dictate finding Defendants in civil contempt of court for violating the
court's injunctive relief order with a corresponding award of fees and costs to Plaintiffs in
bringing Defendants' contempt to light.

49

The remaining matters should be remanded for proceedings consistent with
Plaintiffs5 due process rights. Plaintiffs' claims for declaratory relief concerning whether
Defendants possess the authority to dispose of West Jordan public park property for
private commercial development, and if such authority exists., the procedural safeguards
required to ensure the protection of the public's genuine interest in their public parklands
should be remanded for proceedings consistent with the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act.
Plaintiffs' claim for removal of Defendants from office should be remanded
consistent with UCA 77-6-1 et seq. with the order of this court that Plaintiffs can both
initiate and maintain the action for removal of Defendants from office subject only to the
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Further, should Plaintiffs prevail in the important public

interests on Plaintiffs' declaratory relief claims and on the removal claims, that this Court
order such additional fees as Plaintiffs may incur to be awarded under the private attorney
general doctrine.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of July, 2002.

KENNETH R. IVORY, P.C.
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Attorney for Appellants
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